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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a National Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
M S COMMODITIES, INC; M S COMMODITIES 
OF UTAH, INC.; PRISCILLA SECREST; 
MAURIE SCHNEIDER; J. MORONI STOOF; 
EDWARD DALLIN BAGLEY; DAL-RON 
ENTERPRISES, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a National Association, 
Third Party Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
CLARK TANK LINES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Third Party Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff and third party 
plaintiff-respondent, Zions First National Bank ("Zions") 
for recovery against the defendant-respondents on an 
overdrawn account and on signatures, endorsements and 
warranties on two returned checks. Defendant-respon-
dent, M-S Commodities, Inc. ("M-S") asserted a coun-
Case No. 
13669 
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terclaim on a wire transfer of $25,000 by it to Zions, claim-
ing that Zions had failed to disburse said funds in ac-
cordance with instructions given to it by M-S. Zions 
joined third-party defendant-appellant, Clark Tank Lines 
Company ("Clark") on a third party complaint alleging 
that Clark had wrongfully diverted the proceeds of the 
said wire transfer to its own use. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a five-day trial of the case beginning October 
15,1973, the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
Salt Lake County, entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and a Judgment on Januarry 17, 1974, 
awarding Zions' judgment against M-S in the sum of 
$38,505.08 (plus interest and costs) on the overdrawn 
account. In addition, the court awarded Zions personal 
judgments against Maurie Sohnedder ("Schneider") and 
J. Moroni Stoof ("Stoof") in the amount of the over-
draft ($38,505.08, plus interest and costs) for having 
caused the overdraft by, in Schneider's case, wrongfully 
transferring $75,000 out of the M-S account at Zions and, 
in Stoof s case, by having deposited two bad checks to 
the said account against which Zions extended credit in 
transferring the $75,000. The court also awarded Zions 
judgment against Dai-Ron Enterprises, Inc. in the sum 
of $34,725.50 (plus interest and costs) on one of the re-
turned checks. The trial court further awarded M-S 
judgment on its counterclaim against Zions in the sum 
of $25,000 (plus interest and costs) and in favor of Zions 
on its third party complaint against Clark in the same 
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amount. The court dismissed Zions' claims against Pris-
cilla Secrest, Edward Dailin Bagley and M-S Commodi-
ties,^  Inc. of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Third party defendant-appellant, Clark seeks reveirsal 
of that part of the judgment of the lower court awarding 
M-S judgment on its counterclaim against Zions and 
awarding Zions judgment on its third part complaint 
against Clark. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a Utah corporation and a licensed in-
terstate carrier of certain commodities. 
Defendant-Respondent M-S is an Illinois corpora-
tion which operated a commodities futures brokerage bus-
iness having its principal office in Chicago, Illinois. It 
also maintained branch offices in other cities including, 
from approximately November, 1970 through early 1972, 
Salt Lake City. It is no longer doing business. (R. 649, 
818, 1084; A. 7-8, 55, 233.) 1 
At all times pertinent herein, defendant-respondent 
Maurie Schneider was President, a director and principal 
stockholder of M-S. He had been a commodity futures 
broker for 22 years. (R. 851; A. 13.) 
At all times pertinent herein, defendant-respondent 
xThe letters "R" and "A" refer to the Record in Appeal and the 
Abstract, respectively. 
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J. Moroni Stoof was an agent of and a solicitor for M-S 
at its Salt Lake City office and served as the office man-
ager of said office from the time it was opened in No-
vember, 1970. (R. 570, 649, 1084, 1131; A. 55, 88, 217, 
233.) He was "in charge" of the Salt Lake office (R. 
838, A. 12), having authority, inter alia, to hire and fire 
employees and salesmen, to arrange advertising and to 
lease space and equipment for the business. (R. 898-99; 
A. 25-27.)2 In addition, Stoof was at all pertinent times 
President, a director and stockholder of Dai-Ron Enter-
prises ("Dai-Ron"). (R. 571, 649, 1086; A. 58, 218, 233.) 
Prior to the opening of the local M-S office Stoof had 
been employed by Clark Tank Lines as its controller and 
he continued to work for Clark Tank Lines on a part-
time basis after becoming an agent for M-S in November, 
1970, until about March 16,1971. (R. 803, 1130; A. 7, 88). 
Bagley also was at all pertinent times a solicitor for 
and agent of M-S at its Salt Lake City office. (R. 649, 
904-08, 1033; A. 30-33, 45, 233.) Operating under Dal-
Ron, a now defunct Utah corporation, organized by them 
in the fall of 1970, he and Stoof acted as commodity brok-
ers for various customers trading in commodities futures 
contracts through said office as well as trading for their 
own account. (R. 1033, 1085-86; A. 45, 57-58.) Stoof, 
2The Trial Court found that Stoof was co-manager of the Salt 
Lake office with Edward Dallin Bagley ("Bagley"). (R649) Bagley 
testified that he discussed this possibility with M-S but declined to 
accept it. (R. 1033, A. 44) In any event, Stoof was recognized by em-
ployees in the office as the person "in charge." (R. 838, A. 12) 
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Bagley and their wives were the only directors and stock-
holders of Dai-Ron. (R. 1171; A. 100.) 
Dai-Ron maintained a checking account at the South 
Davis Security Bank on which Stoof and Bagley were 
authorized co-signatories. (Exh. 24-P; A. 209.) Although 
the signature card for this account specified that both 
signatures were required, both Stoof and Bagley had, in 
fact, drawn checks on the account by their individual 
signature which were honored by the drawee bank and 
their business relationship was such that they "didn't 
worry about" having two signatures on Dai-Ron checks, 
(R 1093; A. 61.) Stoof and Bagley also cashed checks 
made payable to Dai-Ron upon their individual, single, 
endorsement. (R. 1113; A. 78.) 
In connection with the operation of its Salt Lake 
office, M-S maintained several bank accounts with Zions, 
including the "M-S Commodities, Inc. Customers Segre-
gated Fund Account" ("Segregated Fund Account"), 
with which this appeal is concerned. (R. 569, 755-76; 
Exh. 4-P; A. 2, 204-05, 217.) This was a depository ac-
count for funds of the customers of M-S's Salt Lake City 
office. The funds of each customer were maintained 
separate and apart within the account from funds of 
other customers in accordance with the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 42 Stat. 998, 49 Stat. 1491, 7 U. S. C. §§1-17. 
All monies in the account were customer funds and were 
not funds of M-S Commodities. (R. 754, Exh. 2-P; A. 1, 
203.) Stoof was authorized to endorse checks for deposit 
into the Segregated Fund Account, but no checks could 
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be drawn against the funds in the account. (R. 570, 794; 
A. 61, 217.) Funds deposited in the account were trans-
ferred between Zions and a similar customers segregated 
fund account maintained by M-S at the Harris Trust and 
Savings Bank in Chicago, Illinois ("Harris Trust"). 
Maurie Schneider and Priscilla Secrest (Vice President 
of M-S) and other M-S employees in Chicago were au-
thorized to withdraw and transfer funds from and be-
tween these two accounts. (R. 650-51, 988-89; A. 42-43, 
234-35.) In addition, Stoof and Bagley were authorized 
to request the M-S Chicago office to transfer funds from 
Harris Trust to Zions for account customers. (R. 909; 
A. 34.) 
The events with which this appeal is concerned oc-
curred principally on Monday, March 15, 1971. On the 
morning of that day, Stoof endorsed and deposited into 
thes Segregated Fund Account for Dai-Ron a check for 
$34, 725.50 payable to M-S drawn on insufficient funds 
by him alone as President of Dai-Ron on the Dai-Ron 
account at South Davis Security Bank. (R. 651, 1092; 
A. 60, 235.) Later the same morning Stoof telephoned 
Schneider in Chicago and requested that $25,000 be 
transferred to Zions from the segregated fund account 
of Dai-Ron Enterprises at Harris Trust. Stoof told 
Schneider that $34,,725.50 had been deposited into the 
Segregated Fund Account for Dai-Ron that morning 
which, together with Dai-Ron funds already on hand 
at Harris Trust and sales commissions due from M-S to 
Stoof, would provide ample funds for the transfer, even 
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after deducting $9,000 for a margin call on the Dai-Ron 
account that morning. (R. 854-57, 110-11; A. 13-16, 75-
76.) During the same morning, Betty Lou Curtis, Stoof's 
secretary at the Salt Lake M-S office, also called the 
M-S Chicago office several times requesting that the 
$25,000 be transferred to Zions. (R. 1279-80, 1282; A. 
147-48, 150-51.) After seeing a wire photo of the deposit 
slip, Schneider directed the M-S bookkeeper, Bruce 
Bochner, to transfer the funds from the Dai-Ron account 
at Harris Trust in Chicago to Zions. (R. 653, 857; A. 
16-17, 237.) This transfer was effected by means of an 
Advice of Credit from Harris Trust to Zions in the sum 
of $25,000, bearing the notation "for credit of Dai-Ron 
Enterprises." (Exh. 54-DMS; A. 214.) 
The Trial Court found that Schneider transferred 
the funds at Stoof's request for him to use to buy out 
Bagley's stock and interest in Dai-Ron, that the $25,000 
transfer represented the difference between the $9,000 
margin call on the Dai-Ron account and the $34,725.50 
Dai-Ron check deposited earlier in the morning of March 
15th, that Stoof made the deposit intending to try to get 
the $25,000 sent back to him to use for his own purpose 
and that the $25,000 was a return to Dai-Ron of funds 
deposited on behalf of Dai-Ron. (R. 652-53; A. 236-37.) 
Of particular significance to this appeal is the trial court's 
further finding that the $25,000 so transferred on March 
15, 1971, did not belong to Stoof personally, but were 
funds which belonged to Dai-Ron. (R. 653, 658; A. 237, 
242.) 
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On March 15, 1971, none of the officers or employees 
of Clark Tank Lines (except Stoof) knew that Stoof had 
been embezzling funds from Clark. (R. 807, 1116-18, 
1127-28, 1177, 1305; A. 7, 79-80, 86, 104.)3 On that day, 
however, Craig Maddux, a Clark employee, knew that 
Stoof owed Clark $50,000, which Stoof had obtained from 
Clark about a week before.4 Maddux's actions on March 
15, 1971, were directed toward obtaining payment of this 
obligation. (R. 1293-94, 1338-39; A. 160, 192.) 
Around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of March 15,1971, 
Stoof telephoned Maddux and told him he had $25,000 
3This fact was first revealed to Clark's President, Boyce R. Clark, 
On March 17, 1971, following Stoof s confession to his church leaders 
on the evening of March 16, 1971. (R. 1115-18; A. 79-80) 
4The details of this transaction, which is only pertinent to this 
case to show Clark's bona fide right to receive the $25,000 on March 
15, 1971, are as follows: On or about March 8, 1971, Stoof had ob-
tained $50,000 of Clark funds by representing to Maddux, Clark's of-
fice manager, who had worked under Stoofs supervision both before 
and after Stoof became M-S's local office manager (R. 1131, 1174, 
1299-1300; A. 89, 102-03, 166) that he (Stoof) was going to make a 
temporary personal loan of $50,000 to Clark to use in paying a Clark 
indebtedness in that amount owed to American National Bank. He 
told Maddux he would take his personal check for $50,000 to Ameri-
can National and instructed Maddux to issue to him a Clark check 
in the same amount which he would hold for several days until Clark 
had funds to cover it. Several days later, on or about March 10th, he 
informed Maddux that the American National Bank had refused to 
accept his personal check in payment for the Clark obligation and 
instructed Maddux to purchase for Clark a $50,000 cashier's check 
from Walker Bank and take it to American National, which Maddux 
did. During the conversation, Stoof told Maddux he would come to 
Clark later the same day and return the $50,000 previously given to 
him, which he failed to do. Between March 10th and March 15th, 
Stoof telephoned Maddux several times and told him he would be in 
to re-pay the $50,000, each time failing to do so. (R. 1289-92; A 157-
60) 
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coming from Chicago which would repay half of the 
$50,000 indebtedness. Stoof instructed Maddux to go to 
Zions and pick up a cashier's check made payable to 
Clearfield State Bank and to deposit it to the Clark Tank 
Lines account at that bank, this being the normal way 
transfears of funds were handled between Clark's bank ac-
counts. (R. 1294; A. 161.) 
Either before or just after talking to Maddux, Stoof 
telephoned Zions and spoke to Karen Christensen, a bank 
employee assigned to its wixe transfer desk. (R. 1124, 
1172-73, 1195-96; A. 83, 101, 115.) Christensen had met 
Stoof previously and knew he was the Salt Lake repre-
sentative for M-S and was also connected with the Dal-
Ron account. She recognized his voice. (R. 653, 1196, 
1203-04; A. 115, 122-23, 237.) Stoof instructed her that 
the funds coming from Chicago were to be disbursed in 
the form of a cashier's check made payable to Clearfield 
State Bank and authorized her to deliver this check to 
Maddux. (R. 653, 1125, 1137-38, 1156, 1196; A. 83-84, 
93-94, 96, 115, 237.) During the same morning, Chris-
tensen also spoke by telephone with Stoof's secretary at 
the M-S office, Betty Lou Curtis, who also informed 
Christensen that the check representing the funds was 
to be made payable to Clearfield State Bank. (R. 1125, 
1279-80; A. 83, 148.) 
Maddux arrived at Zions approximately 15 to 30 
minutes after receiving Stoof's telephone call (R. 1324; 
A. 184), went to the bank's wire transfer desk and told 
them he had been sent by Stoof to pick up the funds. 
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After being informed that the funds had not yet arrived 
he stated that he was going to talk to Stoof and left. 
(R. 1200, 1318-19; A. 119, 178-79.) Maddux then went 
to the M-S Commodities Salt Lake office where he 
waited during the noon hour until word was received 
from Zions that the funds had arrived. (R. 1295-96; A. 
162-63.) While he was waiting at the M-S office, a tele-
phone call from the Zioos wire transfer desk was received 
by Stoofs secretary, Betty Lou Curtis, inquiring about 
the identity of the person who had stopped at the bank 
to pick up the funds. Curtis informed the person calling 
that it was "Craig Maddux," identifying him as an em-
ployee of Clark Tank Lines,5 and then passed the tele-
5The testimony is somewhat conflicting concerning how Maddux 
was identified to Christensen and the Trial Court made no factual 
finding on the matter. Christensen claimed that she never knew Mad-
dux was a Clark Tank Lines employee and he was not identified to 
her as such. ( R 1198, 1202; A,. 117-18, 121) She stated that Stoof 
told her a representative of Clearfield State Bank would pick up the 
check (R. 1198-99; A. 118) and that when Maddux first arrived at 
her desk he told her he had "come down from Clearfield" to pick 
up the funds. (R. 1199; A. 119) She also said that during Maddux's 
first or return visit she asked him to provide identification from 
Clearfield State Bank which he did not do, giving her his driver's 
license verifying that he was Craig Maddux. (R. 1197; A. 116-17) She 
specifically admitted that Maddux did not tell her he was from Clear-
field State Bank. (R. 1197-98; A. 117) Stoof testified that he told 
Christensen the funds would be picked up by a representative of 
Clark Tank Lines and that he believed he gave her Maddux's name. 
(R. 1124, 1137-38; A. 83-84, 93-94) Betty Curtis testified that in her 
telephone conversation with Christensen around noon on March 15th, 
while Maddux was in the M-S office she told Christensen that the 
man Christensen had described to her was Craig Maddux and that 
he was employed at Clark Tank Lines. (R. 1280-81; A. 149) Maddux 
denied telling Christensen he was from Clearfield at any time and 
stated that Christensen's only request to him was that he identify 
himself as Craig Maddux, which he did by producing his driver's 
license. (R. 1297, 1319; A. 164, 179). He testified that Christensen 
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phone to Stoof who handled the call from thereon. (R. 
1281-82; A. 149-51.) 
Maddux returned to Zions at about 1:00 p.m. to 
pick up the funds which had arrived from Harris Trust 
under an Advice of Credit bearing the notation "For 
Credit of Dai-Ron En*erpirise3w. (R. 1200, 1296j> Exh. 54-
DMS; A. 119, 163, 214.) Christensen prepared Cashier's 
Check No. L24055 for $25,000 payable to Clearfield State 
Bank (Exhibit 52-DMS; A. 212) and gave it to Maddux, 
attached to which was a stub bearing the notation: 
Funds wired for the Dai-Ron Enterprizes [sic] 
March 15, 1971 $25,000 kc Mar transfer from 
Hariris Trust in Chicago. 
(R. 1201-02, 1297-98; Exh. 53-DMS; A. 120-121, 164-65, 
213.) While she was making up the check, Maddux re-
peated the instruction that it be payable to Clearfield 
State Bank. (R. 1195, 1296; A. 115, 163.) Maddux then 
took the check to Clearfield State Bank and deposited 
it, along with other funds, to Clark's account at that 
bank. (R. 1294-95; A. 161-162.) Prior to making that 
deposit, Maddux read the notation on the stub attached 
to the check, but assumed it was merely a bank nota-
tion concerning the source of the funds, (R. 1298, 1322; 
A. 165,182.) The check was endorsed by Clearfield State 
Bank over to Clark and credited to the Clark account. 
was preparing the check at the time of his return visit and that she 
asked him for the name of the payee, to which he replied "Clearfield 
State Bank", this being his only reference to that bank. (R. 1296, 
1320; A. 163, 180-81) 
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Clearfield had never claimed any right to or interest in 
the check or its proceeds, (R. 1294-95; Exh. 52-DMS; 
A. 162, 212.) 
Subsequent events occurring during the period March 
16 through March 18, 1971 resulted in the confession by 
Stoof of his embezzlements from Clark, the visit of 
Maurie Schneider to Salt Lake City for the purpose of 
closing out commodity trading accounts of customers of 
the local M-S office and Schneider's transfer of $75,000 
to Chicago out of the Segregated Fund Account on March 
18, 1971, which, when two checks previously drawn and 
deposited therein by Stoof6 were returned unpaid, re-
sulted in that account becoming overdrawn in the sum 
of $38,505.08. Zions filed suit in this action to recover on 
this overdraft. The trial court found that Schneider had 
wrongfully arranged the $75,000 transfer knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that the $34,725.50 check was no good 
and that there would be insufficient funds to cover the 
transfer. (R. 657, 659; A. 241, 243) Accordingly, the trial 
court entered judgment in favor of Zions against Schnei-
der personally for the amount of the overdraft along with 
judgments in the same amount against M-S and Stoof. 
These judgments are not challenged by this appeal. 
Following the trial, Clark filed its Alternative Mo-
tions for a New Trial or to Amend Findings and Conclu-
sions or to Alter and Amend Judgment. (R. 664; A. 248) 
6The aforementioned Dai-Ron check for $34,725.50 and a check 
for $20,000 drawn by Stoof on his personal account at Clearfield State 
Bank. 
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After the entry in the minutes of the Trial Court's Order 
denying a new trial and the Motion to Alter and Amend 
Judgment,7 Clark timely filed its Notice of Appeal8 ap-
pealing to this Court from the portions of the trial court's 
judgment reading as follows: 
1. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED, that defendant 
M-S Commodities, Inc. is awarded judgment on 
its counterclaim against plaintiff Zions First Na-
tional Bank in the amount of $25,000.00, plus in-
terest and costs. 
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED, that third party 
plaintiff, Zions First National Bank,, is awarded 
judgment against third party defendant Clark 
Tank Lines in the amount of $25,000.00 plus in-
terest and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Appeal from Judgment of Trial Court Award-
ing MS Commodities Judgment on its Coun-
terclaim Against Zions in the Sum of 
$25,000 
At the close of M-S's evidence on its counterclaim 
Zions and Clark Tank Lines moved for dismissal thereof 
for insufficiency of proof, including M-S's failure to prove 
damages or its standing to maintain the counterclaim. 
(R. 1263; A. 141) These Motions were taken under ad-
7The Trial Court granted, in part, Clark's Motion to Amend 
Findings and Conclusions. 
8R. 701-03; A. 251-53. 
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visement and the Trial Court subsequently entered judg-
ment for M-S on the counterclaim for $25,000 based upon 
its conclusion, that: 
Plaintiff Zioms First National Bank was neg-
ligent in releasing the $25,000 wire transfer of 
March 15, 1971, which had been sent for the 
credit of Dai-Ron Enterprises to representatives 
of Clark Tank Lines, by check made payable to 
the Clearfield State Bank, and M-S Commodi-
ties is entitled to a judgment of $25,000 as an 
offset to its liability to Zions First National Bank. 
R. 659-60; A. 243-44) [Emphasis supplied.] 
The sole basis asserted by M-S Commodities for re-
covery on its counterclaim was that it had transferred the 
$25,000 for the "credit" of Dai-Ron and Zions had failed 
to follow this instruction in releasing the funds to Craig 
Maddux. During the trial, M-S expressly withdrew any 
claim on its counterclaim based upon fraud. 
MR. MESERVY: 
* * * 
In the circumstances, I feel that goes to my ques-
tion of the fraud angle of my counterclaim; that 
is, that the $25,000 was obtained by fraud and 
therefore with no title passed. I feel at this point 
I am unable to prove that and it would probably 
shorten the trial if I conceded that point and 
proceeded on my counterclaim only on the basis 
of the strict liability of the bank as our agent and 
having received these funds and failed to disburse 
them per our instruction and we are entitled to 
have them back from the bank. (R. 1242; A. 133) 
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To sustain this claim, M^S was required to prove each 
of the following elements by a preponderance of the evi-
dence: (1) a specific instruction from it to Zions; (2) 
failure by Zions to use the applicable standard of care 
in carrying out such instruction; (3) damage to M-S 
proximately caused by such failure by Zions. 
Appellant submits, for the reasons set forth in the 
following Points I through VI, that the Trial Court erred 
in its above-quoted Conclusion of Law and in awarding 
M-S judgment on its counterclaim on the basis for re-
covery asserted by it, or on any basis, on the grounds 
that such judgment is unsupported by the evidence and 
is contrary to the Trial Court's findings, the evidence and 
the law. Inasmuch as recovery by M-S on its counter-
claim was and is a condition precedent to Zions' recovery 
on its Third Party Complaint against Appellant Clark, 
reversal of the judgment on the counterclaim would auto-
matically require reversal of the Third Party judgment 
without any need for considering the merits of that action. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT 
TO M-S COMMODITIES ON ITS COUNTER-
CLAIM BECAUSE THE $25,000 WERE 
FUNDS BELONGING TO DAL-RON ENTER-
PRISES AND M-S COMMODITIES HAD 
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NO INTEREST THEREIN, SUFFERED NO 
DAMAGE WITH RESPECT THERETO AND 
HAD NO STANDING TO MAINTAIN THE 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
The Trial Court's judgment awards M-S damages for 
the "loss" of funds which the Trial Court expressly found 
belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises. This factual finding is 
fully supported by the record and the only conclusion to 
be drawn therefrom is that M-S suffered no loss or dam-
age with respect to the $25^000 transfer and, indeed, had 
no standing to maintain its counterclaim. Consequently, 
the Trial Court erred in awarding judgment to M-S on the 
counterclaim. 
In its summary of the evidence made at the trial im-
mediately after final arguments, the Trial Court clear-
ly stated that the funds belonged to Dai-Ron: 
Now, as I see it, that $25,000 is a return of 
$25,000 of the $34,000 included in that check 
which Stoof told Schneider he had deposited to 
the M-S account in Salt Lake City that day. They 
were deposited as funds from Dai-Ron Enter-
prises. They were Dai-Ron Funds. They were not 
Stoof's personal funds. . . . 
* * * 
What was done, was done with Dai-Ron Enter-
prises money and not with Stoofs money. (R. 
1341; A. 194-95) [Emphasis supplied.] 
This factual finding was reiterated by the Trial Court 
in Paragraphs 24 and 41 of its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
24. The $25,000 wire transfer on March 15,1971, 
did not belong to J. Moroni Stoof personal-
ly, but were funds which belonged to Dai-Ron 
Enterprises, Inc. (R. 653; A. 237) [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
41. Representatives of Zions First National Bank 
atoted negligently in releasing a cashier's 
check for $25^000 payable to Clearfield State 
Bank to Craig Maddux at the request and 
instructions of J. Moroni Stoof and Craig 
Maddux. The said check was based upon a 
wire transfer request from M-S Commodities 
"for the Dai-Ron Enterprises", and a release 
of those funds payable other than to Dal-
Ron Enterprises at the mere direction of J. 
Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux constituted 
negligence on the part of the bank. The 
funds belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises. (R. 
658; A. 242) [Emphasis supplied.] 
This finding is fully justified and amply supported by 
the evidence. First, all parties conceded that the $25,000 
transferred was debited to "Dai-Ron Customer Account 
No. 40041," this being Dai-Ron's customer account in the 
M-S Customers segregated fund account at Harris Trust 
in Chicago. (See Paragraph 3n of the Pre-Trial Order, 
R. 571; A. 217-18) 
Second, M-S admitted that the segregated fund ac-
counts in Chicago and in Salt Lake City were, in effect, 
one account containing only customers' funds. Priscilla 
Secrest testified: 
Q. All right, lest we fall into the trap of think-
ing there is a conflict here, what is tihe differ-
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ence between the Segregated Fund Account in 
Utah and Zions, and the Segregated Fund Ac-
count in Harris Bank in Chicago? 
A. There is really no difference between the two. 
They are only located in two different banks. 
Q. All right, they are part of the same overall 
accounting system? 
A. They are all customer segregated funds of 
M-S Commodities no matter where they are 
located. (R. 989; A. 43) 
It was always understood that the funds in the segre-
gated fund account belonged to M-S's customers and not 
to M-S. In its letter of September 21(, 1970, sent to Zions 
for the purpose of establishing the segregated fund ac-
count at that bank, M-S stated: 
Please acknowledge, by signing and return-
ing to us the enclosed copy of this letter, that you 
have been informed that the funds from time to 
time deposited in the aforesaid account are those 
of our commodity customers and are being held 
in accordance with the provisions of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act. (Exh. 2-P; A. 203) [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
The Commodities Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998, 49 
Stat. 1491, 7 U. S. C. §§ 1-17, pursuant to which the segre-
gated fund accounts were maintained at Zions and Harris 
Trust, specifically provides that funds in the account are 
customers' funds which do not belong to the commodities 
commission merchant (i.e., M-S Commodities) or any 
other person and that it is unlawful for the commodities 
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commission merchant to hold, dispose of or use them as its 
own property.9 
Thus, the debiting of Dai-Ron's Customer Account 
No. 40041 at Harris Trust for the purposes of transferring 
the $25,000 to Zions could only have involved Dai-Ron's 
funds, as expressly found by the Trial Court. There is 
clearly a resonable basis in the record to sustain this 
factual finding.10 What cannot be sustained, however, is 
the Trial Court's judgment, in the face of such finding, 
awarding M-S damages on its counterclaim for the loss 
of Dai-Ron's money. M-S did not allege, and there is no 
evidence even suggesting that it had reimbursed or was 
obligated to reimburse Dai-Ron for the $25,000 and was 
therefore the assignee of or subrogated to Dai-Ron's, 
claim. 
Appellant has had and continues to have exttfame 
difficulty in perceiving any basis upon which the Trial 
9[S]uch person [i.e., registered commodities commission mer-
chant] shall, whether a member or non-member of a contract market, 
treat and deal with all money, securities, and property received by 
such person to margin, guarantee, or secure the trades or contracts 
of any customer of such person or accruing to such customer as the 
result of such trades or contracts, as belonging to such customer. 
* * * 
It shall be unlawful for any person, including . . . any depository, 
that has received any money, securities, or property for deposit 
in a separate account . . . to hold, dispose of, or use any such money, 
securities or property as belonging to the depositing futures commis-
sion merchant. . . . 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (Supp.) [Emphasis supplied.] 
10The Trial Court's factual findings are presumed to be correct 
unless the evidence clearly shows otherwise. DeWitt Distributors, Inc. 
v. Bond Furniture, Inc., Sup. Ct., No. 13625 (Utah, Oct. 21, 1974); 
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428 150 P.2d 100 (1944). 
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Court could award judgment to M-S in face of its deter-
mination that the funds belonged to Dai-Ron. In its Find-
ings, the Trial Court stated that the $25,000 transfer was 
intended by Stoof "to be nothing more than a return to 
Dai-Ron of $25 [thousand] of the $34,000 deposited in the 
M-S account that morning on behalf of Dai-Ron" and that 
Stoof deposited the check with the intent of getting the 
$25,000 back from M-S. (R. 652-53, 1341; A. 194, 236-37) 
However, M-S did not even claim that Stoof obtained the 
funds by some nefarious design. During the trial, it ex-
pressly withdrew any claim that the funds were obtained 
from it through fraud and that title thereto did not "pass" 
from it.11 Furthermore, Stoof s intent in having the money 
transferred has absolutely nothing to do with the question 
of whose funds were being transferred. The Trial Court 
expressly found that they belonged to Dai-Ron and the 
record clearly supports this determination. For example, 
there is ample evidence from which to infer that $25,000 
of Dai-Ron's funds were available for transfer on March 
15, 1971, independent of Stoof s $34,725.50 deposit to the 
Dai-Ron account on that day. Exhibit 58-DC; (A. 215), 
an M-S accounting record for Dai-Ron's account, shows 
that on the morning of March 15,1971, Dai-Ron had $18,-
357.50 in its cash account with M-S. In addition, it would 
"See statement of Mr. Meservy made at R. 1242; A. 133 quoted 
above at page 14. Furthermore, if Stoof s intent were a material issue 
it could not help M-S's claim against Zions. Stoof acted as M-S's agent 
in directing Zions to release the funds (see discussion under Point 
III, infra) and the consequences of any improper motive by Stoof 
should be imposed upon it rather than Zions, an innocent party. As 
the actor, M-S must bear the loss even if it were equally innocent 
with Zions. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 146. 
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have had whatever surplus was reflected in its equity ac-
count.12 Although the record is silent as to balance in Dal-
Ron's equity account on March 15, 1971, if there was a 
negative balance it was M-S's burden to prove it, which 
it did not do. In the absence of such proof, and in view 
of the Trial Court's express finding that the $25,000 were 
Dai-Ron's funds, this Court is entitled (indeed, obligated) 
to presume that Dai-Ron's equity and cash accounts at 
least equaled $25,000 on that date. 
Other evidence which may have confused the Trial 
Court concerned oral testimony by Secrest and Schneider 
that M-S suffered a net loss in the Dai-Ron Account as 
a result of trading losses incurred in closing out the ac-
counts of its Salt Lake office while Schneider was in Salt 
Lake during the period of March 16-18, 1971. If the Trial 
Court based its detecrmination that M-S was entitled to 
recover the $25,000 upon this testimony it committed clear 
error for at least two reasons. 
First, although M-S had the burden of proving the 
amount of its damage, neither Secrest, Schneider nor any 
other witness offered any evidence (oral or otherwise) as 
to the amount of trading losses allegedly incurred by M-S. 
12Priscilla Secrest explained that M-S maintained two accounting 
records for each of its customers. One, a cash account, is illustrated by 
Exhibit 58-DC, and represents the amount of cash of the customer on 
hand and available for trading purposes on a given day. The second 
account represents the customers equity position in its commodities 
future contracts and is a function of his losses or gains in such con-
tracts. (R. 1260-62; A. 138-41) 
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The record is simply silent on this essential point. Indeed, 
M-S failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it suffered any losses, its only evidence being the bald 
statements of Secrest and Schneider that losses occurred 
without any supporting documentary or oral evidence con-
cerning the specific trading transactions, amounts of loss, 
etc. Northing in the record supports a damage award in 
any amount. Certainly, nothing suggests that M-S's losses 
even approached $25,000. The court cannot (but the Trial 
Court in this case did) relieve M-S of its burden of proof 
by awarding it damages for which no evidence exists. 
Second, all of the trading losses claimed by M-S oc-
curred (if they occurred at all) after March 15, 1971, and 
cannot support M-S's claim that it suffered damage when 
Zions disbursed to Clark Tank Lines the $25,000 trans-
ferred to Zions by M-S on that day. The record conclu-
sively establishes that any trading losses claimed by M-S 
were caused solely by frantic trading activity during 
March 17-18, 1971, in Salt Lake City under Schneider's 
personal, on-the-scene supervision, after it became appar-
ent that Stoof had serious problems and would no longer 
be working for M-S, Schneider and Secrest testified that 
on March 16, 1971, many customers of M-S's Salt Lake 
office had large positions in soybean contracts and that 
the soybean market went against these positions on the 
morning of March 17. (R. 870, 1225-27; A. 20, 126-27) 
Because of this and Stoof's departure from the local of-
fice, Schneider came to Salt Lake and undertook an in-
tensive two day effort to contact the customers of the 
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Salt Lake office concerning their market positions.13 
Schneider admitted that any losses existing in the Dal-
Ron account on March 18,1971, would have resulted from 
these trading losses and not from allocating Salt Lake of-
fice expense to this account. (R. 913-14; A. 33-34) Be-
cause of the volatile nature of the commodities futures 
market14 it is, perhaps, possible that losses occurred in 
these accounts during this period. However, the record 
doesn't indicate the amount of any such losses and, in any 
event, they all occurred after March 15, 1971, when the 
transaction upon which M-S's counterclaim was based was 
entirely consummated and could not have been caused by 
any act of Zions. Indeed, M-S's counsel admitted during 
the Trial that evidence of losses in the Dai-Ron account 
occurring after March 15,1971, were not relevant to M-S's 
counterclaim.15 
13This effort was referred to by several witnesses. Secrest testified 
that on March 17, 1971, Schneider was in Salt Lake "attempting to 
contact the various customers . . . to ask them what to do with their 
position." (R. 1228; A. 128) She said that when the soybean market 
opened at 9:30 on that day, "one side went one way and the other 
side went the other which was contrary to our position." (R. 1229; 
A. 129) Betty Curtis and Dal Bagley also testified that they were 
heavily involved under Schneider's direction in calling customers of 
M-S's Salt Lake office about their positions on March 17 and 18, 
1971. (R. 824-25, 830, 1042-45; A. 8-11, 49-50) 
14Secrest testified that market prices can fluctuate sharply in a 
matter of seconds. (R. 1224; A. 126) 
15Following M-S's withdrawal of its claim that the funds were 
obtained from it by fraud, the following colloquy occurred: 
MR. MESERVY: If the Court please, it would appear to 
me in view of my stipulation into the record at the com-
mencement of this session the issues of losses in this account 
would no longer be relevant since they were relevant to 
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Finally, the Trial Court may simply have been 
troubled because Stoof was using money which the Court 
found belonged to Dai-Ron to pay his personal debt to 
Clark. The Court repeatedly stressed that the $25,000 was 
not Stoof's money. (R. 653, 1342-43; A. 196-96, 237) Ap-
parently, it simply forgot that it wasn't M-S's money 
either, even though M-S was the party seeking damages 
for its "loss". Whether Dai-Ron had or has ground to 
complain has never been an issue in this case. The Trial 
Court's error in awarding M-S judgment on the counter-
claim is clear even though its ratio decidendi is not. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT ZIONS 
WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING THE 
$25,000 TO CLARK BECAUSE ZIONS FULLY 
COMPLIED WITH THE INSTRUCTION 
CONTAINED ON THE ADVICE OF CREDIT 
the question of the fraud and the fraud count on our coun-
terclaim. At the present time they would not be relevant 
to our position in our claim back for the $25,000 from the 
bank. 
THE COURT: Well, it might have some bearing upon 
whose money the $25,000 was, you see. 
MR. MESERVY: Well, I don't believe that would be so, 
Your Honor, because we are talking about a situation sev-
eral days after the $25,000 was transferred out. (R. 1248; 
A. 135) 
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(EXHIBIT 54-DMS) IN DISBURSING THE 
FUNDS. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the notation on the Advice 
of Credit was, as M-S contends, the only instruction given 
to Zions in connection with the $25,000,16 and that M-S's 
actual intention was for Dai-Ron to receive the funds,17 
the evidence conclusively shows that Zions faithfully com-
plied with such instruction. 
An important fact apparently overlooked by the Trial 
Court was that Stoof was at all times, including March 
15, 1971, Dai-Ron's President, holding, on the date, draft 
authority on Dai-Ron's checking account at South Davis 
Security Bank. (R. 571, 649, 1086; Exh. 7-P, Exh. 24-P; 
A. 58, 207, 209, 218, 233.) Zions' actions on March 15th 
must be viewed in light of these facts. 
First, in disturbing the funds to Dai-Ron, Zions could 
only deal with that company's officers and employees.18 
Disbursement of the funds to Dai-Ron's President, Stoof, 
or at his discretion was, in fact, disbursement to Dai-Ron. 
Secondly, the facts known to Zions when it dis-
bursed the $25,000 upon Stoof's instructions were cer-
16In fact, the instructions received by Zions included instructions 
received from M-S's agents, Stoof and Curtis. See discussion under 
Point III, infra. 
17In fact, M-S's actual intention was for Stoof to receive the funds. 
See discussion upnder Point IV, infra. 
18
 A corporation can only act through its agents and employees. 
Stratton v. West States Constr., 21 Utah 2d 60, 140 P.2d 117 (1968); 
19 CJS Corporations § 999. 
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tainly sufficient to clothe him, in Zions' eyes, with at 
least the apparent authority to direct the distribution 
of Dai-Ron's funds.19 Christensen testified that she knew 
that Stoof, in addition to being the local representative 
for M-S, was also connected with the Dal-Ron account. 
(R. 653, 1203-04; A. 123, 237.) On the morning of March 
15, 1971, Stoof had deposited into the Segregated Fund 
Account at Zions a check for $34,725.50 drawn by him 
as President of Dal-Ron on Dai-Ron's corporate account 
at South Davis Security Bank. (R. 651, 1092; Exh. 7-P; 
A. 60, 206, 235.) Thus, when Zions distributed the $25,-
000 it was holding physical evidence of Stoof's authority 
to disburse Dai-Ron's corporate funds. 
M-S has argued that Stoof was not authorized to 
draw checks on the Dal-Ron account at South Davis 
Security Bank without the co-signature of Dal Bagley, 
since the account signature card purportedly required 
both signatures. (Exh. 4-P; A. 204.) Zions, however, 
was unaware of any such requirement and the Dal-Ron 
check drawn and deposited with it by Stoof on March 
15, 1971, contained nothing on its face to indicate that 
two signatures were needed. In fact, there is only one 
signature line on the printed check. Furthermore, the 
record shows that in practice checks had been drawn on 
the account by Stoof and Bagley individually, had been 
19Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a person who mani-
fests to a third person that another is his "agent", is bound by the 
actions of such "agent" regardless of the latter's actual authority. 
Restatement, Agency 2d § 8. 
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honored by the drawee bank, and that the parties didn't 
"worry" about having two signatures on the checks. (R. 
1093; A. 61.) Regardless of the number of signatures 
required, however, it is unconfaoverted that Stoof was 
an actual signatory on Dal-Ron's checking account and 
he proclaimed such authority to Zions on March 15, 1971, 
by depositing with it the Dai-Ron check drawn by him 
on that date. 
In holding Zions negligent, the Trial Court placed 
great emphasis upon the fact that the funds were dis-
bursed in the form of a check payable to Clearfield State 
Bank, rather than to Dai-Ron. Indeed, in the Trial 
Court's view, this fact was determinative on the question 
of Zions' negligence. The Trial Court stated: 
And certainly the bank employee that signed 
the cashier's check had some responsibility in 
failing to see that that check was made out to 
Dai-Ron Enterprises. But it seems to me that 
the bank had an aboslute duty in disbusing funds 
to do so by check made payable to Dai-Ron 
Enterprises and to no one else. (R. 1342; A. 
195.) 
[R]elease of those funds payable other than to 
Dai-Ron Enterprises . . . constituted negligence 
on the part of the bank. (R. 658; A. 242.) 
Perhaps the Trial Court was troubled by the fact that 
by having the check made payable to Clearfield State 
Bank, rather than to Dai-Ron, Zions may have facilitated 
Stoof's personal use of the funds to partially pay his 
existing indebtedness to Clark Tank lines. 
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It should first be noted that the instruction on the 
Advice of Credit only directed Zions to "credit" the funds 
to Dal-Ron; it did not preclude Zions from thereafter 
disbursing them as directed by Dal-Ron. Presumably, 
the receipt of the funds was properly reflected by Zions 
as a credit to Dai-Ron's account when the funds were 
received and with a corresponding debit entry when they 
were disbursed. The record is silent on this point but it 
was M-S's burden to prove non-compliance with the in-
struction. 
Appellant does not claim that as Dai-Ron's President, 
Stoof had inherent authority to pay his personal obliga-
tions with corporate funds. Appellant simply contends 
that Stoof's use of the funds is immaterial to M-S's right 
to recover against Zions in this case. At best, Stoof's 
use of the funds could only give rise to a claim by Dal-
Ron for their return, a claim not made in this action or 
elsewhere.20 No party herein claims to be an assignee of 
or subrogated to Dai-Ron's claim. 
Furthermore, the manner in which Zions disbursed 
the funds, by a check payable to Clearfield State Bank, 
did less to facilitate Stoof's personal use of the funds 
than if it had made the check payable to Dal-Ron. As 
Dai-Ron's President, Stoof could easily have endorsed 
20Dal-Ron did not complain, counterclaim or crossclaim against 
any party in this action. Bagley testified that he had never made 
any legal claim to the $25,000. (R. 1036; A. 47) Stoof said that Bag-
ley had never made any claim to him for the $25,000. (R. 1126, A. 84) 
By such failure to assert a claim Dal-Ron has either ratified Stoof's 
use of the funds or is estopped from now asserting any right to the 
funds. Gordan v. Pettingill, 105 Colo. 214, 96 P.2d 416 (1939). 
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the check and used the funds for his own purpose. In-
deed, as President, he possessed the implied or inherent 
power, by virtue of his office, to endorse commercial 
paper on behalf of the corporation. 2 Fletchers, Corpo-
rations § 601. Furthermore, any bank negotiating a Dal-
Ron check endorsed by him as a fiduciary of Dai-Ron 
would be protected from liability even if he used the 
funds for his own purpose unless the bank had actual 
knowledge of such use or otherwise paid the check in 
bad faith.21 A check payable to Clearfield State Bank, 
however, was beyond Stoof's fiduciary endorsement 
power. It could only be transferred to Clark by proper 
endorsement by Clearfield State Bank. This, in fact, was 
done, and Clearfield has never made any claim to the 
check or the proceeds thereof. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT ZIONS 
WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING THE 
$25,000 TO CLARK BECAUSE THE "IN-
STRUCTIONS" RECEIVED BY Z I O N S 
FROM M-S CONCERNING SUCH DIS-
BURSEMENT INCLUDED ALL INSTRUC-
TIONS RECEIVED FROM THE AGENTS 
AND EMPLOYEES OF M-S'S SALT LAKE 
2i § 22-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
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OFFICE, WHICH INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
FULLY COMPLIED WITH BY ZIONS. 
In claiming that Zions failed to follow its instruc-
tions in disbursing the $25y000, M-S relied solely upon 
the notation "For credit of Dai-Ron Enterprises" as set 
forth in the "Advice of Credit" received by Zions from 
Harris Trust in connection with the transfer. (Exh. 54-
DMS; A. 214.) Both M-S and the Trial Court failed 
to recognize that the "instructions" received by Zions 
concerning the disbursement of the funds included not 
only this notation, but also the specific, direct instruc-
tions given it by Stoof and Betty Curtis, both agents 
or employees of M-S at its Salt Lake office. 
The specific instructions given to Karen Christensen 
(Zions' wire transfer desk clerk) by Stoof were to dis-
burse the funds in the form of a cashier's check payable 
to Clearfield State Bank and to deliver said check to 
Craig Maddux. (R. 653, 1125, 1137-38, 1156, 1196; A. 
83-84, 93-94, 96, 115, 237.) These same instructions were 
repeated to Christensen by Betty Curtis, a secretary and 
bookkeeper at M-S's local office. (R. 1125, 1279-80; A. 
83„ 148.) Zions fully complied with the instructions re-
ceived from Stoof and Curtis in disbursing the funds, 
M-S can't point only to the instruction which came 
to Zions from Harris Trust and ignore or disclaim re-
sponsibility for more explicit instructions given to Zions 
by its local agents. This is particularly so where the 
instructions were given by Stoof, whom M-S had ap-
pointed as the manager of its local office. 
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The powers of an agent are particularly 
broad in the case of one acting as general agent 
or manager; such a position presupposes a de-
gree of confidence reposed and investiture with 
liberal powers for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in transactions and concerns which 
are incidental or appurtenant to the business 
entrusted to his care and management. 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Agency §86. 
Christensen testified that she accepted and followed 
Stoof's instructions because she had met him previously 
and knew he was M-S's representative for its Salt Lake 
office. She also said she knew he was connected with 
the Dai-Ron account. (R. 653,1196, 1203-04; A. 115, 122-
23, 237.) Stoof was, as admitted by Schneider, specifically 
authorized to request transfers of customers' funds from 
Chicago to Zions in Salt Lake. (R. 909; A. 34.) 
Furthermore, the instructions received by Zions from 
the local M-S agents were given repeatedly on the day 
of the transaction. Betty Curtis testified that she spoke 
by telephone with Karen Christensen several times on 
that day concerning the transfer, during which conver-
sations she told her to make the check payable to Clear-
field State Bank and that Maddux would pick it up. (R. 
1279-82; A. 14S-51.) In addition, Stoof spoke with Chris-
tensen at least twice, giving her the same instructions. 
(R. 1124,1281; A. 83,149.) Zions was literally bombarded 
with instructions from M-S's local agents concerning the 
distribution of the funds. 
The instructions were and are binding upon M-S, 
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who knowingly caused and permitted Stoof and Curtis 
to be its agents and to appear as such to Zions, who re-
sponded to their directions in good faith. Under such 
circumstances, M-S is responsible for their acts even 
though they may have been acting fraudulently, for their 
own account and not in M-S's interest. Restatement, 
Agency §§261 and 262; 3 C. J. S. Agency §257. 
It is, however, for the ultimate interest of per-
sons employing agents, as well as for the bene-
fit of the public, that persons dealing with agents 
should be able to rely upon apparently true 
statements by agents who are purporting to 
act and are apparently acting in the interests 
of the principal. Restatement, Agency 2d §262, 
Comment a. 
The Trial Court's judgment unjustly rewards M-S and 
penalizes Zions for faithfully and fully complying with 
the instructions of M-S's agents. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S M O T I O N S FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT 
ZIONS WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING 
THE $25,000 BECAUSE M-S INTENDED 
THAT THE FUNDS BE DISBURSED TO 
STOOF, DID NOT INTEND ZIONS TO BE 
INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, AND ZIONS 
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PROPERLY FOLLOWED M-S"S INTENDED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Not only did the trial court fail to consider the en-
tire instructions given to Zions by M-S and its local 
agents, it also failed to recognize that the notation on 
the Advice of Credit was not the "imtruction" intended 
by M-S concerning the funds. The evidence clearly 
shows that (1) M-S did not intend the notation on the 
Advice of Credit to be an instruction to Zions, (2) M-S 
intentionally transferred the funds to Stoof, for his own 
personal use, (3) M-S intended the funds to be picked 
up, rather than "credited" to Dai-Ron's account as stated 
in the notation, and (4) Zions fully complied with M-S's 
intent in disbursing the funds. 
Schneider admitted that the notation on the Advice 
of Credit (Exhibit 54-DMS) was not a directive to the 
bank to do any particular thing with the funds, but was 
merely a bookkeeping memorandum for M-S. (R. 1329; 
A. 187-88.) He further stated that he sent the funds 
only as an "accommodation" to Stoof, for him to use 
to buy Dal Bagley's interest in Dai-Ron. (R. 854, 1325; 
A. 14, 184.) When asked what he intended Zions to do 
with the funds he stated that it was to hold them for 
"pick up" by Dal~Ron. (R. 1328; A. 187.) 
These admissions show that the true intention was 
for Stoof, not Dai-Ron, to get the funds. The issue of 
Stoof's authority to use the Dai-Ron money is immaterial 
to the issue of Zions' liability for failure to follow the 
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alleged "instmctions". Assuming he was not, that could 
only give rise to a claim by Dai-Ron never made in this 
action or elsewhere. It is clear from the evidence that 
M-S when faced with Zions' claim on the overdrawn ac-
count, seized upon the notation on the Advice of Credit 
as a basis for asserting its counterclaim, notwithstand-
ing that at the time of the transaction its intention was 
to get the funds to Stoof rather than to Dai-Ron. Zions 
fully complied with the intended instruction by disburs-
ing the funds according to Stoof's directions, 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT 
TO M-S BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS 
THAT M-S'S DAMAGES, IF ANY, WERE 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY ITS OWN 
AGENTS. 
Appellant submits that M-S failed to prove by suf-
ficient evidence that any damage suffered by it was prox-
imately caused by Zions and that the evidence clearly 
shows that any such damages were caused by M-S's 
agents and employees, Stoof and Curtis, by the direct 
statements made by them to Zions (as recited under 
Point III, supra) concerning the manner in which the 
funds were to be disbursed. These statements were the 
independent inteivening proximate cause of any loss suf-
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fered by M-S and it cannot recover from Zions therefor. 
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711 
(1959); HiUyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 
143, 263 P. 2d 287 (1953). 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN IM-
PROPER STANDARD OF CARE UPON 
ZIONS IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS LI-
ABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE IN DISBURSING 
THE $25,000. 
Appellant submits that the Trial Court erred by 
imposing an improper standard of care upon Zions in 
holding that it was liable for negligence in disbursing 
the funds. 
Utah has adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act 
(§ §22-1-1, et seq., U. C. A., 1953, as amended, the "Act"), 
the purpose of which is to establish uniform and definite 
rules to govern the liability of banks and others who deal 
with fiduciaries. Under the statute, banks are not liable 
for negligence, which is the only basis upon which the 
Trial Court imposed liability upon Zions in this action. 
The general purpose of the Act is to estab-
lish uniform and definite rules in place of the 
divers and indefinite rules now prevailing as to 
"constructive notice" of breaches of fiduciary 
obligations. In some cases there should be no 
liability in the absence of actual knowledge or 
bad faith; in others there should be action at 
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peril. In none of the situations here treated is 
the standard of due care or negligence made 
the test. (Commissioners' Note to §1 of the Act, 
quoted in II Paton's Digest §22A: 1.) [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
For the purposes of the Act, a "fiduciary" includes 
an "agent", an "officer of a corporation" or "any other 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person". 
§22-1-1, U. C. A., 1953. On March 15, 1971, Stoof was 
an agent of M-S and President of Dai-Ron. 
Section 2 of the Act (§22-1-2, U. C. A., 1953) pro-
vides as follows: 
A person who in good faith pays or transfers to 
a fiduciary any money or other property which 
the fiduciary as such is authorized to receive, 
is not responsible for the proper application 
thereof by the fiduciary; and no right or title 
acquired from the fiduciary in consideration of 
such payment or transfer is invalid in conse-
quence of a misappUcation by the fiduciary. 
Under this statute, Zions is "not responsible" for the 
application of any money paid to Stoof in good faith if 
Stoof was "authorized to receive" such money. Stoof was 
unquestionably authorized by both Dai-Ron and M-S to 
receive the $25,000 from the bank. He was President 
of Dai-Ron, the owner of the funds, having authority to 
draw checks on its account at South Davis Security Bank. 
He was the local office manager of M-S, the person re-
sponsible for maintaining the Segregated Fund Account 
and upon whose "instructions" Zions acted in connection 
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with the transaction. It was clearly Schneider's intent 
that Stoof receive the money and the Trial Court found 
that he sent the funds to Stoof for the purpose of buying 
out Bagley's interest in Dal-Ron. Stoofs actual use of 
the funds is wholly immaterial to the issues of Zions' lia-
bility under the statute. Under the Act, the bank is "not 
responsible" for the bad faith of the fiduciary so long 
as the bank itself acts in good faith. The whole purpose 
of the Act is to protect banks and other persons dealing 
with fiduciaries from incurring liability for the fiduciary's 
breach of trust unless the bank has actual knowledge of 
such breach or otherwise acts in bad faith. The record 
does not suggest, nor did the Trial Court find, that Zions 
had any indication of Stoof's intended use of the money 
or that it acted in bad faith. 
Furthermore, even if Utah did not have the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, Zions' non-liability for mere negligence 
is established under principles of general common law. 
It is well recognized that under Utah law at the time 
the causes of action in this case arose,22 a plaintiff's con-
tributory ordinary negligence barred recovery for dam-
ages caused by the ordinary negligence of the defendant. 
E. g. Rogers v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 32 Utah 367, 
90 Pac. 1075 (1907).23 A fortiori, where the plaintiff has 
"Utah's comparative negligence law did not become effective 
until May 8, 1973. Laws of Utah, 1973, Ch. 209. 
23This principle is applicable in an agency relationship. An agent's 
contributory negligence bars or does not bar his principal from re-
covery against a third party to the same extent as the principal's own 
contributory negligence. Restatement, Agency 2d § 317. 
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acted intentionally, in bad faith* or has been grossly or 
wantonly negligent or reckless, he cannot recover from 
a defendant whose conduct amounts only to ordinary 
negligence. 
As previously stated (see Point I II) , in disbursing 
the funds, Zions responded to the directions of M-S's 
local agents and employees, including its local manager. 
The only inference to be drawn from the evidence is that 
Stoof and Curtis acted intentionally in giving these in-
structions to Zions, for the purpose of causing the funds 
to be disbursed in the manner prescribed by them. They 
were not simply negligent in giving such instructions but 
acted intentionally, for a specific purpose. As principal, 
M-S placed them in the position to so act and was re-
sponsible for regualting and supervising their conduct. Re-
statement, Agency 2d §213. Under such circumstances, 
Zions can only be liable for complying with the inten-
tional instructions of the M-S agents if it acted with 
knowledge that the disbursement was improper or in bad 
faith or under circumstances amounting to gross or wan-
ton negligence, none of which were found by the Trial 
Court. The Trial Court's determination that Zions was 
ordinarily negligent is an insufficient legal basis upon 
which to impose liability and the judgment against it on 
the counterclaim must therefore be reversed. ! 
B. Appeal from Judgment of the Trial Court 
Awardiing Zions Judgment on its Third Par-
ty Complaint Against Clark Tank Lines. 
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POINT VII. 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT AWARDING M-S JUDGMENT 
ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM WILL REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF ZIONS THIRD PARTY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST CLARK T A N K 
ONES. 
Under Rule 14, Utah Rules of Cvil Procedure, Zions' 
cause of action on its Third Party Complaint against 
Clark can arise only upon Zions' first being held liable 
to M-S on the latter's counterclaim. The prayer for re-
lief in Zions' Third Party Complaint is based upon the 
fulfillment of this condition precedent. (R. 182-83.) 
Therefore, reversal of the judgment in favor of M-S on 
its counterclaim will automatically require reversal of 
the Third Party judgment without need for any consid-
eration of the merits of that action. 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDG-
MENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF ZIONS ON THE THIRD ARTY 
COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCH JUDGMENT 
IS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY FINDING OF 
ACTIONABLE WRONG COMMITTED BY 
CLARK VIA-A-VIS ZIONS, B E C A U S E 
CLARK COMMITTED NO SUCH ACTION-
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ABLE WRONG AND WAS NOT UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHED BY RECEIVING THE FUNDS. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Trial Court made the following factual findings in sup-
port of its conclusion that Clark was liable to Zions on 
the Third P&rty Complaint: 
42. The said $25,000 was deposited by 
Craig Maddux into the aocount of Clark Tank 
Lines, and helped Mr. Maddux achieve a partial 
return to Clark Tank Lines of $50,000 which 
Stoof had obtained from Maddux, drawn on the 
Clark Tank Lines account a few days before. 
43. Clark Tank Lines received the $25,000 
in question and used the funds for its own pur-
poses, although officials of Clark Tank Lines, 
other than Stoof and Maddux had no knowledge 
of the transaction prior thereto. 
44. J. Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux 
were acting together on behalf of Clark Tank 
Lines in obtaining the said $25,000 from Zions 
First National Bank as aforesaid. 
45. Third Party Defendant, Clark Tank 
Lines, benefitted by reason thereof to the extent 
of $25,000 which it neither earned nor deserved. 
(R. 658; A. 242.) 
In entering these findings, the court considered and 
rejected the following proposed findings prepared by coun-
sel for Zions, modifying them as set forth in the forego-
ingParagraphs 44 and 45. 
44. J. Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux 
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were acting together on behalf of Clark Tank 
Lines, and obtained the said $25,000 from Zions 
First National Bank by deceit, trickery and/or 
misrepresentation. 
45. Third Party Defendant, Clark Tank 
Lines, benefitted by Stoof's fraud to the extent 
of $25,000, which it neither earned nor deserved. 
(R. 698; A. 229.) 
Thus, the Trial Court expressly refused to find that 
Clark obtained the funds from Zions by "deceit, trickery 
and/or misrepresentation" or by reason of "fraud" on the 
part of Stoof. Indeed, the court didn't find that Clark's 
actions were in any way wrongful. 
Appellant submits that the Trial Court's findings 
show that Clark committed no actionable wrong upon 
which to base liability to Zions on the Third Party Com-
plaint, that the record contains no sufficient evidence up-
on which to base such liability and that the evidence is 
contrary to a determination of such liability. 
The only evidence which in any way connects Clark 
to the release of the funds by Zions is that Stoof and 
Maddux were Clark's employees on March 15,1971. With 
respect to Stoof, however, it is clear that in directing 
Zions to make the cashier's check payable to Clearfield 
and to give it to Maddux, he was acting as M-S's agent 
and/or as Dai-Ron's President, and not as Clark's em-
ployee. Christensen testified that she complied with 
Stoof's instruction because she knew he was M-S's local 
representative and was connected with the Dai-Ron ac-
count. Nothing in the record suggests that she had any 
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knowledge that he was employed by Clark. Stoof was 
successful in obtaining the release of the funds because 
he was M-S's agent and Dai-Ron's President, not because 
of his part-time employment at Clark. If Stoof acted 
wrongfully in causing Zions to disburse the funds, that 
wrong is attributable only to M-S or Dai-Ron, and not 
to Clark. 
Maddux's position is somewhat different since he was 
employed only by Clark on March 15, 1971, and was not 
associated with M-S or Dai-Ron. Maddux, however, did 
nothing wrongful in connection with the transaction. All 
he did was to receive the funds in partial payment of a 
bona fide obligation owed to Clark by Stoof. The Trial 
Court's only finding was that he and Stoof were "acting 
together" in obtaining the funds. Concerted action is not, 
however, inherently wrongful and the Trial Court ex-
pressly found that neither his nor Stoof's actions were 
deceitful or constituted trickery, misrepresentation or 
fraud. 
The Trial Court's statement in Paragraph 45 that 
Clark neither "earned nor deserved" the $25,000 is di-
rectly contrary to the evidence and the Court's further 
finding in Paragraph 42 is that the funds were a "partial 
return to Clark Tank lines of $50,000 which Stoof had 
obtained from Maddux, drawn on the Clark Tank Lines 
account "a few days before," (R. 658; A. 242.) The 
evidence is uncontroverted that the money was a pay-
ment of a bona fide debt owed by Stoof to Clark. The 
Trial Court's finding was perhaps motivated by its re-
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luctance to allow Clark to receive Dai-Ron's money in 
satisfaction of Stoof s personal debt. The question of 
Stoof s authority to use these funds in this way is not, 
however ,material to the issue of Clark's liability on the 
Third Party Complaint. Clark "deserved" to have Stoof s 
debt repaid and was not unjustly enriched by receiving 
the funds. Whether it had a right to repayment out of 
Dai-Ron's funds is a question that could only be raised 
by Dal-Ron or someone standing in Dai-Ron's shoes as 
its assignee or subrogee, positions not occupied by Zions. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the Trial Court's judgment 
in favor of M-S on its counterclaim is erroneous on any 
of the numerous grounds above set forth. The judgment 
awards M-S damages for the "loss" of funds which the 
Trial Court expressly found belonged to Dal-Ron and for 
a "loss" which in any event was caused by M-S's own 
agents. The Trial Court totally failed to recognize that 
M-S's own agents, Stoof and Curtis, instructed Zions 
concerning the distribution of the funds and the evidence 
clearly shows that Zions followed these instructions, the 
instruction received from Harris Trust and the instruc-
tions actually intended by M-S. The Court also imposed 
an erroneous standard of care in holding Zions liable for 
ordinary negligence. 
Appellant further submits that the Third Party judg-
ment in favor of Zions is unsupported by the evidence 
and the Trial Court's findings and is contrary to the evi-
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dence and law. Furthermore, it must be reversed if the 
judgment on M-S's counterclaim is for any reason re-
versed. 
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the 
portions of the Judgment of the Trial Court herein ap-
pealed from and for its costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD J. OCKEY, of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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